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In dealing with the contribution of Sir Samuel Griffith to the framing of the
Federal Constitution at the 1891 National Australasian Convention whose centenary
we are now celebrating I can make no claim to originality. Griffith has already been
the subject of Roger Joyce's magisterial biography,1 as well as in two postgraduate
theses which have stood the test of time, one by Bishop John Vockler and one by Dr
Ross Johnston.2 Nevertheless, Griffith was a complex and many-sided character,
subtle and guarded in his lifetime, elusive for his subsequent biographers. We may be
too readily misled by the portraits of his mature years, in which the face is framed in
the trappings of high judicial office and the mouth shrouded by a generous white
beard. He may have seemed cold and even dull; but he wasn't.
Of course the impression of sobriety is borne out by the major achievements of his
public career. He was above all a man of words, whose strength lay in the drafting
and interpretation of legalism, so that on his one excursion into the creative arts - his
translation of Dante, often mentioned, seldom read - the poetry was somewhat
blighted by the restrained hand of the legal draftsman. He can be seen as a man of
compromise, who stopped the traffic in Pacific Islanders only to reinstate it under the
pressure of economic necessity, and who wrote in praise of the infant labour
movement only to strike it down at the first major outbreak of industrial militancy.
But there were passions in the man. There was the fascination with Welsh
romanticism which led him to christen his eldest son 'Llewellyn' after the 13th
century patriot Llewellyn ap Gruffyd with whom Sir Samuel yearned to establish
kinship. There was the reluctant sympathy with the outlaw which broke through his
stern insistence on justice, so that when he sentenced the Kenniff brothers to death his
voice broke, and a court official noted that 'he shook so that the rug covering his
knees failed to hide the tremor'.3 And there was surprisingly often a robust
conviviality. I regret that Roger Joyce's biography does not include the story of
Griffith's visit to Burketown at a period when he was none too popular in North
Queensland. When the usual complimentary dinner was given the locals conspired to
drink their distinguished visitor under the table. At daybreak the following morning
only two figures remained upright. One was Griffith. The other was a squatter whom
Griffith escorted to the street outside, and then thoughtfully watched him as he rode
away on a camel which was not his own in a direction which was not the direction of
his property. It is as well to remember this side of Griffith as well as the man whom
the Sydney Daily Telegraph described in 1891 as 'a slave to public duty'4 and whom
John La Nauze, in his fine study The Making of the Australian Constitution
characterises as 'behaving like many a good teacher' at the 1891 convention.5
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Australasian Convention of 1891, though in recent years historians have come to
differ about the lasting value of his achievement. Alfred Deakin, the chronicler of the
federal movement as well as a leading participant, ungrudgingly gave Griffith credit
for devising the forms of words which enabled the powerful colonies of Victoria and
New South Wales to agree with the outer colonies of Queensland, South Australia,
Tasmania and Western Australia on the role of the Senate as against the House of
Representatives. Without that compromise, Deakin argued, the federal movement
might have fallen at the first hurdle.6 Later historians, including La Nauze, have
tended to echo him. But the veteran political scientist L.F. Crisp, writing in the late
1970s in the aftermath of the dismissal of the Whitlam government, took a much
more critical look at what he called 'the narrowly conservative and provincialist
federalism of the Griffith-Barton-Turner-Clark-Baker-Forrest school, which urged
their constitutional confection on the Australian people on a "now-or-never", "take-it-
or-leave it" note at the end of the 1890s'.7 Crisp suggests that this 'narrowly,
conservative and provincialist federalism' triumphed because Deakin and the
Victorians were prepared to pay any price for federation as the way out of the
financial morass into which the Victorian economy fell in the early 1890s. They
rushed into federation where cooler heads of a more genuinely democratic temper,
such as George Reid and H.B. Higgins, would have prolonged the negotiations until a
more equitable system - i.e. one which gave greatest weight to the greatest centres of
population, such as Melbourne and Sydney - could be achieved. Undoubtedly Crisp
was influenced by the role which Griffith and the others played in giving the states'
House, the Senate, that power to reject or to delay the passage of finance bills which
proved so troublesome to the Whitlam government and at length provoked the
controversial intervention of Sir John Kerr. Does this justify his epithets: narrow,
conservative, provincialist?
Narrow and conservative are not adjectives easily applied to Griffith; certainly not
the Griffith of 1891, however much his sympathies may have hardened in later years.
Provincialist he undoubtedly was. In so many aspects of his life he began as an
outsider, a marginal man distanced from the centres of prestige and authority. It was
not just that he was a Queenslander in a continent where wealth and population were
concentrated in Victoria and New South Wales. He was Welsh, not English;
Congregationalist, not Anglican or Catholic; a colonial, not a metropolitan Briton; and
even in the colonial context, he was a product of Maitland and Brisbane, not the cities
of Melbourne and Sydney. He could not have been anything else but a provincial. The
impressive thing about Griffith is that he grew into a great provincial, ready and able
to tackle the challenge of knitting together the colonial provincialisms of his time into
the makings of an Australian nation.
We should look a little more closely at Griffith's provincial origins. The
significance of his Welsh ancestry lies not so much in his upbringing as in what
Wales came to symbolise for him by his middle years when he was engaged in the
federal movement. Roger Joyce has pointed out that in his earlier years Griffith was
not entirely at home in his Welsh background, and did not even visit Wales during his
visit to Britain in 1881. But I think we must make something of the choice of the
name 'Merthyr' for the fine new house which he built for his family in 1880. Merthyr
Tydfil was, of course, his birthplace, but it was decidedly short on glamour. The ninth
edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica published in the 1880s describes Merthyr
Tydfil as 'situated in a bleak and hilly region on the river Taff' and adds: 'The town
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irregularly built, and at one time, on account of its defective sanitary arrangements,
was frequently subject to epidemics of great severity'.8 For a rising young lawyer to
name his home 'Merthyr' was like calling it 'Wigan' or 'Shoreditch', a gesture of
defiance to the conventional. Perhaps Griffith calculated that few Queenslanders had
ever visited Merthyr Tydfil. But it is not surprising that by 1887 he was enough of a
professional Welshman to be serenaded with 'Men of Harlech' on his departure from
Australia, nor that he enjoyed the civic banquets proffered him at Merthyr Tydfil and
Cardiff during that visit.9
One could not lay claim to Welsh connections without identifying with the
successful struggle of the Welsh to maintain their culture, if not their political
independence, against the encroaching English; Griffith's loyalties lay with the small
battalions against the big. Joyce also argues that Griffith's father was conscious of
social hierarchies and critical of the establishment in Britain. He was certainly aware
of the importance of social recognition for Congregationalism in Queensland, and this
must have had its effect on Samuel. The Congregationalists were one of the smaller
Protestant faiths in Queensland - even in 1891 there were only 8,571 of them, barely
2 per cent of the entire population - and it must have been a continuing problem to
ensure that their voice was adequately heard. Like many a successful professional
man before and since, Griffith eventually drifted into Anglican churchgoing, but his
early upbringing would have left him with a knowledge of what it was to belong to a
minority. However his successful professional and political career also taught him
that it was possible for an outsider to enter the citadels of power, to overcome rebuffs
and opposition, and through sheer force of intellect and diligence to exercise effective
leadership. He was a confident provincial who would not be intimidated by others
who seemed gifted with a more favourable start.
This confidence was immediately apparent at his first encounter with the federal
movement in 1883. It was his rival McIlwraith whose annexation of eastern New
Guinea in April 1883 stimulated the Victorian premier, James Service, to urge an
intercolonial conference to consider federation, and Griffith's early public reactions
were cool; but, having won the Queensland elections and become premier early in
November, Griffith went almost immediately to the Convention in Sydney, and there
assumed a leading role.10 Neither he nor the other colonial premiers shared Service's
enthusiasm for an immediate federation, but it was Griffith's confident draftsmanship
which produced the interim proposal for a federal council. Its powers were modest;
they included marine defence, Australasian relations with the Pacific islands, the
exclusion of criminals (mostly escapees from the French penal colony of New
Caledonia) and the regulation of quarantine. As New South Wales and New Zealand
stayed out of the Federal Council, its impact was limited, and it eventually faded into
oblivion in 1899 with the imminent approach of Federation proper. Yet it was an
important step in Griffith's career, since it established the new and largely unknown
premier of Queensland as an uncommonly skilful wordsmith whose skills could
produce a workable consensus acceptable to political colleagues of greater seniority
and experience. Without this successful debut in 1883 it would have been much
harder for Griffith to gain acceptance in the wider Australian arena a few years later
when the impulse towards federation began to quicken.
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when Sir Henry Parkes, capitalising on the defence report of Major-General Bevan
Edwards, uttered his Tenterfield speech and called for a national convention on
federation. Griffith at that time was in opposition, but Parkes nevertheless wrote to
him early in December soliciting his agreement that it was 'time to start moving'11 on
the question of a greater union. By the beginning of 1890 it had been agreed that
delegates from each of the colonies represented in the Federal Council would meet
Parkes in Melbourne in February 1890. Queensland's two nominees were Griffith
himself and his old sparring partner John Murtagh Macrossan, now colonial
secretary. It was typical of those easy-going times that no specific instructions were
given to either delegate. When the conference met in Melbourne it was inevitably
Parkes who opened the proceedings by moving for the 'union of the colonies, under
one legislative and executive Government, on principles just to the several Colonies'.12
But it was by no means inevitable that the following speech should be given by
Griffith, who was no more than Leader of the Opposition from one of the smaller
colonies, and it would be interesting to know how this was decided. All commentators
agree that Griffith performed the essential task of bringing Parkes's splendid but
cloudy generalisations down to earth and identifying the main issues which would
confront a federal convention. He argued that, although the colonies had evolved
through self-government almost into sovereign states, it would be necessary for them
to surrender certain rights and powers in the interests of them all: defence, external
relations, trade and commerce, immigration, copyright and patents but not
necessarily fiscal policy. Where most delegates and most subsequent historians have
seen the need for an Australian common market as a major impetus towards
federation, Griffith was relatively unworried on this score. A federation without
agreement on tariff policy would survive until the absurdity of tariff barriers became
overwhelmingly evident. Of greater importance was the preservation of state rights: 'It
is not intended to transfer to the Executive Government anything which could be as
well done by the separate governments of the colonies'. Griffith thus adroitly ranged
himself in the middle ground between stronger advocates of states' rights such as
Playford of South Australia and Inglis Clark of Tasmania and enthusiastic
federationists such as Parkes and Macrossan.13
In July 1890 the Queensland Legislative Assembly voted to send five of its
members as delegates to the National Australasian Convention scheduled for Sydney
in March 1891; Macrossan and John Donaldson from the ministry, Griffith and
Arthur Rutledge from the Opposition, and Sir Thomas McIlwraith, who had quit the
ministry in dudgeon several months previously but had not yet decided to change
sides. The Legislative Council nominated Andrew Thynne and Thomas Macdonald-
Paterson. A month later Griffith joined with McIlwraith to overthrow the Morehead
ministry and become premier for the second time at the head of what became known
as the Griffs/Wraith coalition. Almost immediately he was confronted with
Macrossan's motion in favour of the separation of North Queensland. So it was that, at
the moment when the rest of Australia was turning to federation as a device for
unifying a fragmented continent, Griffith in Queensland was compelled to seize on
federation as a possible means of preventing his community from splitting apart
entirely.
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to 26.14 It was known that George Silas Curtis and others at Rockhampton were
agitating for the territorial separation of Central Queensland, and the Griffith
ministry could not be entirely sure of withstanding the combined pressure of North
and Central Queensland. On the other hand Queensland's credit on the London
money market would be seriously impaired by the loss of territory and resources
which would follow any separation. Griffith's solution was to put forward in
November 1890 an ingenious scheme for dividing Queensland into three provincial
legislatures which would consist of two houses of parliament exercising a defined list
of powers. There would also be a General Assembly for the whole of Queensland
comprising a House of Representatives elected on a population basis and a Senate
equally representing each of the three provinces. The central government would have
power to raise money by any system of taxation other than customs duties and to
possess overriding power about the immigration of non-Europeans - which of course
was the very issue which had stimulated the sugar industry into demanding
separation. As Ross Johnston has commented: 'Griffith therefore sought to provide in
embryo a type of federal government intended to work until the federation of the
whole of Australia was achieved, whereupon the separate provincial Legislatures
would take their place in the Australian federation as full colonial members... This
task prepared Griffith for the greater strain of drafting the 1891 Constitution'.15 The
experience must also have reinforced his opposition to over-centralisation. National
unity was essential, but it must not be achieved at the expense of regional diversity.
The National Australasian Convention assembled in Sydney on 2 March 1891.16
Parkes, of course, had to be elected president, but it was no empty compliment that
Griffith was chosen vice-president. It was Parkes, however, to whom the honour
would fall of moving the opening resolutions defining the principles required 'to
establish and secure an enduring foundation for the structure of a Federal
Government'. These principles on the whole encapsulated the discussions of the
Melbourne conference. There would be a federal parliament comprising a Senate
representing each state equally and a House of Representatives; a federal Supreme
Court; and an executive comprising the Governor-General and ministers. The Federal
Government's powers would include trade and commerce, defence, and the
imposition of customs duties. Parkes also wanted to include land policy, but was
talked out of it by the other premiers before the resolutions became public. At the
same time there was discussion on the wording of the resolution about trade between
the federated colonies. According to La Nauze it was Griffith who cur the Gordian
knot by saying quite simply that trade and intercourse between the colonies would be
'absolutely free'.17 At the time it seemed am elegant solution, but herein lay the origins
of the endless controversy over Section 92 of the Constitution.
After Parkes had introduced his amended resolutions Griffith, as at Melbourne the
previous year, followed immediately to bring the debate down to earth. For him, the
lion in the path of federation was not the tariff issue which loomed so large for the
Victorians. It was the reconciliation of the rights of the smaller colonies with the
superior wealth and population of Victoria and New South Wales. It followed for
Griffith that the Senate and the House of Representatives must be completely equal in
authority. Of course it was necessary to define their spheres of responsibility so as to
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that the House of Representatives possessed the sole power or originating taxation and
appropriating revenue, but the Senate might exercise a veto. In that way, he thought,
friction between the two houses could be accommodated without an entire
breakdown of the parliamentary system. Griffith was soon pressed on this point by
delegates from Victoria and South Australia who remembered crises when their
Legislative Councils had shown a disposition to reject financial measures passed by
the lower house. Queensland, of course, had experienced no such disputes. Although
the Queensland Legislative Council was completely nominee, consisting mainly of
elderly gentlemen of strongly conservative opinions, it had never challenged a budget
- perhaps precisely because it was aware of the limitations on its authority as an
unelected body. In consequence it was easy for Griffith to under-estimate the passions
which had been released in Victoria and South Australia by conflicts between the two
houses of parliament.
In insisting on the co-equal powers of the Senate Griffith was not necessarily
behaving as a conservative. It was true that the Victorian Legislative Council was a
somewhat reactionary body who intervened on financial bills only in order to
embarrass governments of mildly radical proclivities; but the Legislative Council was
elected on a restricted franchise, whereas the federal Senate would be broadly
representative of the entire electorate. Nor was it necessarily the case that the smaller
states would be more conservative than Victoria and New South Wales. South
Australia in particular had a notable tradition of reformism; and Griffith himself was
still young enough to identify with the forces of progress, although in those very
weeks while he was away from Queensland at the Convention the militancy of the
striking shearers and the provocative intransigence of the pastoral lobby was to force
him towards the conservative camp. But Griffith had placed his finger on the cardinal
issue which had to be resolved before the federal movement could go forward. Should
the will of the House of Representatives prevail on money bills, regardless of the
financial consequences for the States? Or should the Senate be given not only the
power to reject money bills in extreme cases - to which nearly all present were
prepared to consent - but also the power to veto details of the budget? Having
presented the question, Griffith himself was not to be drawn far into defining his own
position, but others were less reticent. By 16 March the question had become what
Deakin described as 'the apple of discord'. James Munro, the millionaire premier of
Victoria, was understood to say that if there was no compromise the Convention
might as well come to an end. Most of his fellow-Victorians thought likewise; so did
Sir Henry Parkes and Thomas Playford of South Australia. On the other hand most of
the representatives from the smaller colonies were keen to uphold the Senate's
powers, and they had the numbers.
Only one man stood aloof to this controversy. John Murtagh Macrossan was a
dying man, and during the Convention he had spoken little, husbanding his strength
for one or two decisive interventions. On 13 March he had spoken in opposition to
Parkes's view that the existing powers, legislative frameworks, and territorial
boundaries of the member-colonies of the Australian Federation should remain
unchanged. Understandably Mascrossan was concerned that North Queensland
might still be free to achieve autonomy in a federated Australia. But on 17 March he
achieved a more farsighted and prophetic vein, almost like the dying John of Gaunt.
While he believed that the Senate should have power to amend money bills, this was
not really an issue of great importance. As Harrison Bryan has written: 'Clearheaded
to the end, he brought the Conference back to life after it had bogged down in inter-
colonial jealousies, by hammering home again the basic idea which was so clear to
him but which still eluded other delegates; that this was a completely new legislation
they were erecting and that they must take care not to think of it merely as acollection of large and small states'.18 Party politics would dominate: 'The influence of
party will remain much the same as it is now, and instead of members of the senate
voting, as has been suggested, as states, they will vote as members of parties to which
they belong. I think, therefore, that the idea of the larger states being overpowered by
the voting of the smaller states might very well be abandoned'.19 These were the
words of a man who believed that the new nation would be 'first Australians, and then
Queenslanders and South Australians and Victorians'. It was his last contribution;
within a fortnight he was dead in his hotel room. Through his intervention, backed by
Griffith and others, the Convention decided that a period of cooling off was required
for this contentious issue. Following the time-honoured practice of dead locked
meetings, they referred the matter to a committee.
In fact there were three committees. One was on finance, taxation, and trade
regulation - McIlwraith of course served on that committee - and another on the
establishment of a federal judiciary. But the third and most important was the
constitutional committee, to which the other two would report. Unlike the two junior
committees, which had only one representative from each delegation, the
constitutional committee had two. Griffith and Andrew Thynne represented
Queensland. It is noteworthy that Thynne should have been chosen rather than
Griffith's old henchman, Arthur Rutledge. Thynne was probably the better choice of
the two; he was more decisive and shared Griffith's wish to preserve state rights while
setting up a federal body with well defined powers. Almost inevitably Griffith was
made chairman of the constitutional committee. As Alfred Deakin put it: 'The real
drafting of the Bill will rest with Griffith but it is chiefly compilation work rather than
original ...'20 He must have overlooked the old bureaucratic adage that it is the man
who writes the minutes who determines what happens. It would fall to Griffith to pull
together the diverse strands of debate and knit them into a coherent, untangled, and
acceptable pattern.
By 24 March, the Tuesday before Easter, the finance and judiciary committees had
submitted their reports to Griffith. He, however, was clear that drafting could not be
completed until after the Easter vacation, and he had selected two of the constitutional
committee to work with him on the task - both, as it happened, from the smaller
colonies, and both, as it happened, politicians who before coming to Sydney are
known to have tried their own hands at drafting. One was Charles Cameron Kingston,
not yet premier of South Australia but already twice attorney-general; a stormy,
radical product of the Adelaide establishment but a draftsman whose technical skills
were second only to Griffith's own. The other was Andrew Inglis Clark of Tasmania,
who had made an intensive study of the American constitution, and was inclined to
refer to it as a suitable model for adaptation to Australian conditions. Clark was an
able and original thinker whose contribution to federal thought has only recently
been given recognition, but one somehow senses that although he and Griffith held
each other in mutual respect they were never really close. Perhaps it was professional
rivalry, perhaps simply the incompatibility of a tall man and a short man.
At any rate Griffith, Kingston, and Clark got to work on the detailed drafting on
Monday 23rd, not without interruptions. Griffith knew how to secure the necessary
privacy for the final stages of drafting. His party had travelled down from Queensland
on the Queensland Government steamer Lucinda, and during the weekends of the
conference Griffith had made good use of the Lucinda by judicious invitations to
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     20 La Nauze, op. cit., p 48; quoting Deakin to C.H. Pearson, 25 March 1891.selected fellow-delegates to come cruising on Sydney Harbour. Now he proposed that
the drafting party should spend Easter on the Lucinda, running up north to the quiet
of the Hawkesbury estuary. Kingston accepted, but Clark at this inconvenient moment
had the misfortune to go down with influenza. Griffith then invited Edmund Barton to
come in as a replacement, thus initiating a relationship which lasted the rest of their
lives. Barton up to this point, while known to be a keen federalist, had not yet won the
prominence which would eventually take him to the first prime ministership of
Australia. Easy-going and convivial, he had not been a regular attender at the
Convention, although his contributions when present had been cogent and useful. But
Griffith recognised his professional quality, which always came to the fore when a
great occasion demanded it; and this brought Barton into the inner ring of policy-
makers for a federated Australia. Apparently as an afterthought it was also decided to
ask Sir Henry Wrixon as a leading Victorian lawyer, Sir John Downer of South
Australia, and Queensland's Andrew Thynne. From outside the Convention, Griffith
also invited Bernhard Ringrose Wise, an able young lawyer who at 33 had already
been attorney-general of New South Wales. But they came along merely for the cruise
and as occasional consultants. It was Griffith, Kingston, and Barton who were to have
the final drafting of the constitution, joined by Clark on the Sunday morning after he
had recovered from the worst of his influenza.
On the first day of the vacation, Good Friday, Griffith may have been regretting his
decision to sail on the Lucinda. For back in Queensland the strikers' camps and
squatters' homesteads of the inland were being deluged by a late summer rain-
bearing depression, and the influence of that depression was felt as far south as
Sydney. The weather reports for that Friday speak of fresh gusty winds and showers,
and Griffith noted in his diary that there was too much swell in the water current, so
he didn't work. Some of those present were seasick in the morning, but by evening
they had anchored at Refuge Bay. Here, Griffith reported, there was a waterfall in the
bush which made a natural showerbath, but 'I did not take it myself'. He in his turn
was sickening for influenza; but the weather had improved by Saturday morning, and
resolutely he led his party to work. They worked from 10 a.m. till 11 p.m. on
Saturday, from 11 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday, and for twelve and a half hours on
Monday. Writing to his wife a few days afterwards, Griffith complained that he
worked too hard on the Constitution. One can appreciate his point.21
The final draft of the Constitution was presented to the Convention on Easter
Tuesday, 31 March. Unlike the Canadian constitution, which allocated certain powers
to the provinces and left whatever remained to the central government, the Australian
practice would be the reverse: specific powers would be granted to the central
government, and the states kept the remainder. As Ross Johnston has pointed out, the
list of powers for the Commonwealth bore a certain similarity to the powers given to
the central parliament of the United Provinces of Queensland as drafted by Griffith in
1890.22 Griffith himself during the debate referred to that list of powers as 'tolerably
complete', and he must have used it as a starting point for the Australian federation.
One innovation, however, owed nothing to the Queensland precedent. This was the
decision to name the new federation 'the Commonwealth of Australia'. Parkes, Deakin,
and Winthrop Hackett of Western Australia all claimed to be godfathers who had
chosen this name, but it ran into a good deal of opposition from some conservative
delegates who associated the term 'commonwealth' with Oliver Cromwell and the
republicanism of 17th century England, and feared that Queen Victoria might take
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'Commonwealth' and it was approved by a narrow but sufficient majority.
But would there be a Commonwealth of Australia? Munro, the premier of
Victoria, had spent the weekend in Melbourne and had given a press conference
expressing great gloom about the prospects of the Convention. They would break up,
he forecast, over the Senate's powers; Victoria could never let itself be dominated by
the smaller members.23 Some of the Victorian delegates were privately regretting that
they had ever let New Zealand and Western Australia into the Convention. Without
them, they might have had the numbers to outvote the smaller states. But Griffith's
committee had picked up an idea from the South Australians, and its recommendation
gave the Senate power to reject a finance bill but not to amend it; at the most it could
communicate requests and suggestions to the House of Representatives, but lacked
power to veto in detail. Griffith pressed this point of compromise as the only solution
acceptable to both points of view, even though not wholly acceptable to either side.
Even then the compromise passed by only 22 votes to 16. Nearly all the Victorian and
New South Wales delegates were in the majority, and Griffith's arguments persuaded
enough from among the more thoughtful of the small-state members - Playford and
Kingston from South Australia, Hackett from Western Australia - to carry the day. At
this stage it was anticipated that the members of the Senate would be chosen by the
parliaments of each state, so that they would be responsive to local interests. It was not
until the 1897-98 federal conventions that it was decided to elect Senators by direct
popular vote, a move in the direction of democracy which probably hastened the
coming of Macrossan's prophecy that the Senate would turn out to be dominated by
party politics.
For the rest, the 1891 Constitution was substantially similar to the Constitution
which became law in 1900 and which is still the basis of the Australian body politic
today. Quick and Garran in their Annotated Constitution list the additional powers
which were added during the debates of 1897-98: astronomical and meteorological
observations, insurance, invalid and old age pensions, conciliation and arbitration,
and the acquisition of property for public purposes; state banking, and power to
legislate for river navigation.24 The Supreme, or High Court, had been provided for,
and a start made on the vexed question of appeals to the Privy Council; a method of
distribution surplus revenue back to the states on a basis of population had been
adopted; and Australia was to be a common market, where capital and labour might
organise on a nationwide basis.
Some details of the 1891 settlement were not destined to survive. There was an
interesting proposal that the states should be free to choose their governors by
popular election rather than by royal appointment. Although this idea was endorsed
by a narrow margin in 1891 it failed to survive discussions later in the decade. On the
other hand Griffith was so convinced of the pivotal importance of the Governor-
General that he pushed the 1891 Convention into asserting that the Governor-
General must be the only channel of communication between the States and the
British sovereign. Provincial rights in this case stood second to the need for clear and
logical lines of authority; but this point was likewise discarded subsequently. Other
initiatives of Griffith's which failed to survive were mostly those arising from his
intellectual elitism, which tended to lead him to mistrust the capacity of the voters.
Thus in 1891 he insisted that amendments to the constitution need not be submitted
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absolute majority of both houses of the Commonwealth parliament and then referred
to specially elected conventions in each State. This was too complicated for the 1897-
98 Convention, and they eventually decided on the referendum process. Griffith
might have rested easy, however, since Australian voters have shown a strong
tendency to say 'No' to most proposals for the widening of federal powers.
The 1891 Convention dispersed in the expectation that follow-up action in the
colonial parliaments would soon ensure. But Parkes in New South Wales was
confronted by the rise of a Labor party which soon ousted him from office in favour
of the anti-federationist George Dibbs. Victoria plunged into a major financial
depression, replete with scandals, and for a time was too preoccupied with schemes of
reconstruction to take a lead on federation. Deprived of this encouragement, the other
colonies marked time. With the exception of Western Australia they were all more or
less affected by economic recession, and federation seemed a lower priority. Griffith
stepped out of active politics in 1893 to become Chief Justice of Queensland. By now,
however, his ambition was firmly fixed on the hope of a prominent role in a federated
Australia. More than once during the federation debates of the remainder of the
1890s his advice, usually sought informally, exercised some influence. Barton
generously admired him; others found his counsel valuable because of his non-
involvement in day-by-day politics. Griffith's presence must have given heart to the
belated federal movement in Queensland, although he felt inhibited as Chief Justice
and Lieutenant-Governor from involving himself too openly. Behind the scenes he
was certainly active, and prided himself on finding an acceptable formula about
appeals to the Privy Council in May 1900, when the Australian delegates to London
reached an impasse in their negotiations with the British authorities.25
When federation came on 1 January 1901, Griffith's frustrated anxiety to
participate in the action led him into uncharacteristic clumsiness. When the first
Governor-General, Lord Hopetoun, made his celebrated 'blunder' of asking the New
South Wales premier, Sir William Lyne, to form the first federal ministry - rather than
Barton, the preferred choice of nearly all the leading federationists - Griffith allowed
himself to dally with the prospect of serving as attorney-general under Lyne.
Consequently, when Lyne threw in his hand, Griffith was too compromised to be
considered for the federal cabinet; and there was a risk that he had damaged his
chances of becoming first Australian Chief Justice, the goal which he most coveted. He
returned from the federation celebrations in Sydney confiding angrily to his diary that
the new Prime Minister, Barton, was a 'fathead'.26
But Barton was a generous man; and when the time came in September 1903 for
the appointment of the first High Court he waived his own claims to the post of Chief
Justice in favour of Griffith. To most contemporaries Griffith was the obvious
nominee. He had earned the honour through his crucial role in the 1891 convention,
delicately adjusting the balance between the centre and the periphery. He may at
bottom have been a provincial; but because of the intense intellectual creativity which
he showed at this important moment in Australian history Griffith can be regarded,
not as the narrow conservative of Crisp's phrase, but as a great provincial capable of
subordinating his local loyalties in the service of wider vision. It was a quality which
modern provincial politicians have too often lacked.
                                                
     25 Joyce, op. cit., pp 212-15; but cf. Quick and Garran, op. cit., pp 242-47.
     26 Joyce, op. cit., p 215.